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Maintaining Hard Disk Integrity With Digital Legal
Professional Privilege (LPP) Data
Zoe L. Jiang, Junbin Fang, Frank Y. W. Law, Pierre K. Y. Lai, Ricci S. C. Ieong, Michael Y. K. Kwan,
K. P. Chow, Lucas C. K. Hui, S. M. Yiu, and K. H. Pun
Abstract—The concept of legal professional privilege (LPP) in
the Common Law is to enable a client to make full disclosure to his
legal advisor for seeking advice without worrying that anything so
disclosed will be used against him. Thus, some of the communi-
cations and documents between a legal advisor and his client can
be excluded as evidence for prosecution. Protection of LPP infor-
mation in the physical world is well addressed and proper proce-
dures for handling LPP documents have been established. How-
ever, there does not exist a forensically sound procedure for pro-
tecting digital LPP information. In this correspondence, motivated
by a real case of a commercial crime investigation, we introduce
the LPP data integrity problem. While finding an ideal solution to
solve the problem is difficult, we propose a practical solution that
was adopted to solve the real case investigation. We also analyze
the performance of our solution based on simulated data.
Index Terms—Computer forensics, data integrity, LPP docu-
ment.
I. INTRODUCTION
D IGITAL crime investigation replicates many legal prac-tices in real world crime investigation. For example,
taking cryptographic hash is used to preserve the integrity of
digital evidence, resembling taking a snapshot of the scene of
crime in real world crime investigation. However, not all real
world legal practices have been incorporated into the digital
forensics investigation framework. One issue, that is essential
to proper administration of justice but rarely addressed, is the
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maintenance of hard disk integrity with privilege documents in
digital world.
The rationale behind having this legal professional privilege
(LPP) in the Common Law is to enable a client who may not
have enough legal knowledge to fully disclose everything to his
legal advisor for seeking of advice without worrying that any-
thing disclosed for this purpose will be used against him. Thus,
the accused is protected from being prosecuted based on private
or unintentional discussion [3] and he has the right to prevent a
particular document from presenting as evidence against him if
it is classified as privileged document [1].
Nowadays, with the advancement in information technology,
communications are no longer limited to paper or telephone
conversations and have extended to various kinds of electronic
communications such as e-mails, instant messaging chats, VoIP
phones and digital video conferences. Furthermore, the doc-
uments prepared for legal proceedings may not exist as hard
copies but may be stored in a computer as Word documents or
Excel spreadsheet files. All these have an impact on the tradi-
tional investigation approach as crime investigators are required
to handle LPP documents in digital format. This is a new area
required to be addressed and a systematic approach is needed
to assist investigators in handling privileged digital documents
properly and effectively.
In the physical world, LPP documents are handled with
extreme caution because the disclosure of any LPP information
may jeopardize the legal proceedings involved. Under the
Common Law, investigators are not allowed to inspect any
documents for which privilege is claimed. When a document
is claimed to be privileged, but an investigator thinks that a
document is likely to be related to a criminal case, he can seize
it and put it in a sealed container, such as an exhibit envelope,
and later submit to the court for determining if the document
can be used for prosecution [8].
When it comes to the digital world, the situation is not as
simple. Usually, these documents and numerous other digital
files are stored in a single physical hard drive. The law enforce-
ment office will seize the hard drive. There is no well-defined
and forensically sound procedure to deal with LPP documents.
Simple solutions as in the followingmay not work. For example,
putting the whole hard drive that contains the claimed LPP files
into an exhibit envelope and letting the court decide the proper
way to handle the digital files stored in there is certainly not
appropriate. This may result in a very lengthy process as the
court may not have the expertise for the task. The non-LPP files
that are in the same drive are needed for investigation. This will
delay the investigation a lot.
1556-6013/$31.00 © 2013 IEEE
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In fact, the majority of existing digital forensics investi-
gation models or procedures do not incorporate a procedure
for supporting legal professional privilege data protection.
For instance, in the DFRWS framework [2], digital inves-
tigation covers the Identification, Preservation, Collection,
Examination, Analysis and Presentation of digital evidence.
It focuses on the technical aspects in collecting, examining
and explaining the hypothesis of incidents without fully in-
corporating the proper practice from the legal perspective [4].
How to handle legal privilege documents was not adequately
addressed. Thus, the protection of these documents can only
rely on individual practitioners and is handled differently in
a case by case manner. In this paper, we identify two issues
of handling privileged documents: (1) the lack of a systematic
procedure and (2) the LPP data integrity problem. crime inves-
tigation case in a law enforcement department of Hong Kong.
It is difficult to have an ideal solution for the LPP data integrity
problem. In this correspondence, we provide a practical so-
lution that was adopted to solve the real case investigation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Based on a real
crime investigation case, Section II describes the problems
we want to address for handling digital LPP documents. Our
proposed solution and the analysis of the solution are presented
in Sections III and IV. Section V concludes the paper. We
remark that although the technical part of the solution may not
be very innovative and our proposed solution still cannot solve
the problem completely, the solution as a whole is shown to be
feasible and serves as a starting point for further research.
II. THE PROBLEMS—MOTIVATED BY A REAL CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION CASE
We first describe a real criminal investigation case and show
that the two common approaches for handling digital forensic
data, namely clone and erase, selective cloning, cannot handle
this case as it involves LPP documents.
A. The Background
In October 2008, a Hong Kong-listed company announced
that the company had bet wrongly on massive foreign-cur-
rency target-redemption forward contracts and daily accrual
(accumulator) contracts for Australian and European dollars,
causing a loss of 800 million Hong Kong Dollars on these
contracts from 1 July to 17 October 2008. Since the contracts
could only be ended until 2010, there was a provisional loss of
more than 15 billion Hong Kong Dollars for these contracts.
The announcement caused a 55% drop in the stock price of the
company. The Government Securities and Future Commission
had initiated an investigation against the company. The case
was subsequently forwarded to the Commercial Crime Bureau
of Hong Kong Police to investigate any criminal aspect on
leveraging the foreign exchange transactions by the company.
In April 2009, the Police raided the head office of the com-
pany with a search warrant and requested its directors to pro-
vide information with regard to the foreign exchange contracts
entered into in 2007 and 2008 and announcements made by the
Company from July 2007 to March 2009. The warrant related
to an investigation of alleged offences, including (i) false state-
ments by company directors; and/or (ii) conspiracy to defraud
under the common law. The Police had seized a wide range of
documents as well as computers and clones of servers that held
almost the entire soft records of the company kept in the head
office for the purpose of its investigation into the allegation.
The seized documents and computer exhibits included approx-
imately 2 terabytes of digital data in total. However, the data
was widely spread in multiple PCs, computer servers and ex-
ternal storage devices of the company.
Since some of the digital data contained information that is
subject to legal professional privilege (LPP), the legal represen-
tatives of the company subsequently lodged an application to
the High Court of Hong Kong claiming LPP in respect of some
of the exhibits. With the amount of digital data involved and the
absence of official protocols in handling digital LPP data, the
company formed a special board committee consisting of di-
rectors new to the board and external legal counsels to discuss
with the police on how the materials seized should be handled.
The Technology Crime Division (TCD) of Commercial Crime
Bureau was the dedicated unit to deal with the digital data in-
volving LPP information.
B. Existing Practices and Shortcomings
There is no standardized, forensically sound procedure to pro-
tect LPP information. Two existing practices, namely clone and
erase, selective cloning, for handling digital information were
explored in the case meeting between TCD and the company.
1) Clone and Erase: Clone and erase is a straightforward
approach. It first prepares a cloned image, that is a bit stream
image acquired from the target digital storage media, and then
erases the LPP documents from it. The sanitized disk image
would be used for later investigation. This process should be
carried out in front of both parties so as to prevent potential
evidence in non-LPP files from being removed intentionally.
One obvious problem is that, the image would replicate all the
digital data, including the deleted LPP documents, which exist
in the storage media. With the assistance of standard computer
forensic tools, one could easily inspect all data including log-
ical files, deleted files or fragmented file data that exist in unal-
located space within the image. This is an obstacle to the proper
protection of LLP documents as deleted LPP information may
still be accessible in the context of investigation if the erasing
is not thorough. Also, the data owner may take a very long time
to view and segregate LPP documents from the enormous dig-
ital data stored in the storage media, and the LPP identification
may be error-prone under a stressful environment. For better
accuracy and efficiency, the process that requires face-to-face
interaction should be kept minimal.
2) Selective Cloning: To avoid any duplication of sensitive
LPP documents, selective cloning tries to conduct a selective
data copy [6], [8] instead of cloning the whole storage medium.
This is, to copy the non-LPP files from the source hard drive to
another storage media for later investigation. The examiner may
firstly connect to the target storage media with a write blocker
device and then selectively extract digital data, excluding the
LPP materials, that are relevant to the investigation. To avoid
any dispute about unauthorized access to LPP data, the whole
process should be carried out in the presence of the data owner,
who is responsible to identify any LPPmaterials andmonitor the
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actions being performed by the examiner. This method offers
the best protection to the LPP files. However, as the copying
is performed with a logical view, deleted files or fragmented
file data in unallocated spaces, which are invisible in the logical
file system view, may be missed out. It can be very unfavorable
for the investigation. Even though the examiner could utilize
computer forensic tool to search for deleted or relevant data in
unallocated spaces, the process would be very time-consuming
and is not practical to be conducted at the scene of crime. Philip
Turner suggested utilizing a selective imaging approach [7] to
perform a selective acquisition of data on a hard drive using the
concept of digital evidence bags [9]. This method is obviously
in contrast to the traditional bit stream cloning but derives a
way to properly handle large amount of digital information in a
forensically sound manner. But, it still involves a very lengthy
face-to-face process.
C. The Problems
Besides other disadvantages, both approaches described in
the above require a lengthy face-to-face process and assume that
the parties involved can identify all LPP documents at the spot.
This assumption is not realistic. To summarize, there are two
issues not adequately addressed in the current practice and re-
search community. The first one is a standardized procedure for
handling digital media with LPP documents inside. The second
one is the LPP data integrity problem. It is a normal practice for
the investigation officers to clone the hard disk once it is seized
(even before the defendant can claim any LPP documents). The
original hard disk will then be sealed and will not be accessed
except a few exceptional cases in order not to corrupt the data in
the original hard disk. The investigation will be carried out on
the cloned copy. An integrity scheme will usually be enforced
during the cloning to ensure that any data found in the cloned
copy is exactly the same as it is inside the original copy.
Now, with the LPP documents, the situation becomes more
complicated. After the cloning, the defendant is allowed to
delete the agreed LPP documents from the cloned copy before
the investigation officers can work on it. Thus, in the ideal
case, we need an integrity scheme so that even if some of the
data are deleted, it can still verify the integrity of the remaining
data. Obviously, designing such an ideal solution is very diffi-
cult. Thus, we propose a solution so that there will be a high
chance that this can be done. Then, supplement it with a “dirty”
trick, we show a practical solution to solve the problem which
has been adopted to the real case (see the discussion in the
concluding section).
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
In this section, we design a high-level procedure to handle
LPP documents while keeping the evidence of hard disk, fol-
lowed by discussing the integrity issue in this procedure and
proposing our hashing scheme.
A. High-Level Procedure
In order to comply with ordinary principles of computer
forensics, it is observed that a bit stream image of the entire
storage device should be taken whenever practicable. To avoid
replicated LPP documents in cloned image being accessed in
the context of computer forensic examination, the acquired
image should not be examined until the content has been
sanitized. For the removal of the LPP documents, the data
owner would be invited to identify the privileged data from
the image. The LPP documents would then be selected and an
assessment would be made to determine if the documents are
legally privileged or not. This assessment may be conducted
by a trusted third party, for example, other investigator who
is not involved in the case or any independent person who is
not involved in the investigation. After the confirmation of
the nature of the document, the LPP documents are destroyed
from the data image. The original digital storage media would
then be sealed whilst the sanitized image would be ready for
computer forensics examination [8].
Taking all these factors into account, we propose the fol-
lowing procedure for handling LPP information:
1) A bit-stream image (cloning) is obtained from the original
hard disk under the supervision of both parties to prevent
any dispute of unauthorized access to LPP document.
2) Upon the completion of cloning, the original storage media
will be sealed and kept in a safe location by the prosecution,
whilst the acquired image will be given to the data owner
for a reasonable period of time to remove any LPP doc-
uments that exist therein by forensically sound methods.
This can be done by zeroing out the data content or re-
placing the content by some easily identifiable characters
like “This is LPP data” in its storage sector(s).
3) After the removal of LPP documents, the data owner will
return a sanitized image and a list of removed files to the
prosecution for verification and record.
4) If there is any dispute or error in the context of LPP data
removal, either party could still recover the erased data
from the original media.
Note that in the above proposed procedure, the data owner
will be given enough time to examine the image, without the
presence of the examiner, in order to identify all LPP files (in-
cluding those logically deleted, but still exist in the image) to be
removed. This provides a more feasible solution to the problem
as the volume of storage media is getting bigger and bigger. Re-
quiring face-to-face interaction during the examination process
will soon be impractical. This procedure also solves the problem
of having the examiner look at the LPP files (as in the case of
selective cloning).
On the other hand, to realize the above procedure, we need an
effective integrity scheme that is done in the cloning step which
can check the integrity of undeleted sectors in the sanitized disk
as the deletion is done without the presence of the examiner. A
bit-by-bit checking is not practical as it requires the use of the
sealed original storage media and also, it requires the presence
of both parties again to overlook the lengthy checking process.
B. The Integrity Issue
To ensure the integrity of a data item, cryptographic hash
value is a common technique. The concept is as follows. Given
any given data item, we can compute a unique hash value based
on a mathematical formula as the signature of the data. The hash
value has the properties that even one bit of the data is modified,
the computed hash value will be different and it is difficult to
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have two different files with the same hash value. It is easy to
check whether the file has been modified if we have stored its
hash value.
For our problem, one can compute a single hash value for the
whole hard disk during the cloning process. But then, it is not
possible to verify the integrity of individual sectors in the san-
itized disk as some of LPP-related sectors have been deleted.
Another simple method is to compute one hash value for one
sector. Thus, the undeleted sector can still be verified by its cor-
responding hash value in the sanitized image. Nevertheless, the
hash set is huge. For example, more than 1 billion hash values
need to be stored and computed for a 500 GB hard disk with
sector size of 512 bytes.
Note that the above approach devours large space although
it offers the best accuracy among the other schemes. With the
rapid changes in technology, the size of hard drive becomes
larger and larger and the number of hashes required would be
substantially increased. This methodology may no longer be
competent to handle the task practically. To enhance the ef-
ficiency, and at the same time maintain the accuracy of the
process, we show look for other efficient schemes.
C. Hashing Scheme
In [10], [11], the authors proposed a hashing scheme
to address the issue for checking the integrity of a hard drive
even if some of the sectors become bad sectors without storing
the hash value for each sector. We develop our scheme based on
this idea. We use , each sector can
be represented by three coordinates, where
, and is the total number of sectors. How to map each
sector to a 3-coordinate point is given in Section III-D. Before
we present the mapping scheme, we provide the framework on
how this 3- scheme works.
Instead of computing one hash value for each sector, by using
this method, for each fixed pair, it generates a hash value
for dimension using the sectors for all from 1 to
; for each fixed pair, it generates a hash value for
dimension using the sectors for all from 1 to ;
for each fixed pair, it generates a hash value for dimen-
sion using the sectors for all from 1 to . The size
of each chain is about and we compute one hash value
for each sector chain. All the hash values are stored in a secure
place for later comparison. After some time when hard disk in-
tegrity checking is required, all the hash values will be recalcu-
lated using the same 3- scheme on the hard disk sectors, then
compared to the originally stored ones.
Each sector has been used to compute three hash
values. The integrity can be verified by comparing any one of
the three corresponding hash values. In our case, however, it is
possible that a sector cannot be verified if there exist deleted
sectors in all three chains. We will address this issue in the
later part of the paper. One advantage of the 3- scheme is to
greatly decrease the number of hash values needed to be stored
compared to , especially when is large. Using the same
example of a 500 GB hard disk, the number of hash values to
be stored decreases from 1 billion to about 3 millions.
Generally, the number of hash values of the scheme
can be calculated as: since there
Fig. 1. Number of hash values for scheme versus the number of total
sectors .
Table I
TIME AND STORAGE NEEDED FOR 3- SCHEME
are hash values in each dimension. The number of
hash values for scheme varying with the number of total
sectors is shown in Fig. 1. As for the computational cost, the
number of hash calculations for the scheme is
since every sector exists in chains. A hard diskwith capacity of
250 GB (total number of sectors ) was tested
with the 3- scheme to evaluate the scheme’s practical per-
formance. Experimental results including absolute time ,
computational time and the actual storage of hash
values are shown in Table I. Here absolute time refers to
the total time for generating integrity information with the 3-
scheme, including the time for reading all sectors and computing
hash values. We also check the time for reading all sectors of a
hard disk, denoted as . The time required for computations
as . It takes 9,459 seconds for reading
the hard disk in our test. The size of each hash value is 128 bits
as MD5 is used in this experiment.
However, there is a problem with the scheme as mentioned
in [10], [11], the scheme fails to verify the integrity of a sector
when there is at least one bad sector on each chain to which
the sector belongs. The sector which cannot be verified due to
the tainted chain is named as affected sector. For example, in
Fig. 4, the scheme fails to verify the integrity of sector
(affected sector) for there is a bad sector with
in dimension, a bad sector with
in dimension, and a bad sector with
in dimension.
Since Word document is a quite common digital format that
is used by ordinary users frequently, it is a typical and important
form of LPP data stored on a hard disk. As a preliminary work,
we erase multiple Word documents to investigate the number of
affected sectors using 3- scheme. Our experiments are based
on tens of the hard disks using NTFS file system, whose storage
sizes are all 250 GB with 488,392,065 sectors. We search for
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Fig. 2. Number of affected sectors in 3- scheme varies with the number of
deleted sectors.
all Word documents with “doc” and “docx” as file extension
from normal users’ hard disks, and find that on average there
are about 3000 Word documents on a hard disk with an average
size of 200 K Bytes (i.e. 400 sectors or 50 clusters). The exper-
imental results for 3- scheme are shown in Fig. 2. 3000 Word
documents are prepared for this experiment and each document
occupies 400 continuous sectors in the hard disk on average.
When the number of deleted sectors for LPP documents is in-
creased from 8000 to 120000, the number of affected sectors for
3- scheme is increased from 100 to 551036 on average, i.e., the
number of affected sectors is increased 5510 times. This result
indicates that when the number of deleted sectors increases, the
chance that an undeleted sector can be verified becomes lower.
The probability of a sector which becomes unverifiable can
be computed as follows. Assume that there is a hard disk drive
containing sectors and the sectors are distributed on di-
mensions. The length of each dimension should be .
If there is only one sector deleted, the probability for each
chain in dimension which will become unverifiable due
to the deleted sectors will be because there are
totally chains in dimension, and the probability
for each chain remains unaffected will be .
Therefore, if there are sectors deleted, the probability for
each chain remains unaffected will be ,
and the probability for each chain becomes unverifiable will be
. The probability of a sector which will
become unverifiable in dimension is equivalent to the prob-
ability for each chain becomes unverifiable due to the deleted
sectors, denoted as . Similarly,
the probability for the other dimensions can be denoted as
, where .
A sector in the space will be affected only when
all of those chains across the sector become unverifiable.
Thus, the probability of a sector becomes unverifiable will
be . Assuming that the affected
sectors are independent, then we can calculate the upper bound
Fig. 3. Estimated number of affected sectors in scheme varies with the
number of deleted sectors.
of the estimated number of affected sectors due to deleted LPP
sectors as: , as shown
in Fig. 3. Note that the assumption of independence may not
hold in real cases, the formula only provides a rough estimation
for reference only.
D. Our Scheme
Recall that we want to solve the following problem. Denote
the total sectors in the hard disk as a set
. Conceptually, each sector can be mapped
to a unique point, , in a 3-dimensional space as follows.
Roughly speaking, we order the sectors along the Z dimension,
then Y, then X dimension.
Then each sector can be rewritten as and the set of
all sectors can be represented as
. For simplicity, we consider the case that is an integer
to the power of 3. For the other cases, the scheme can be easily
extended to handle them. Let be the number of sectors (con-
taining LPP documents) to be deleted. We want to verify the in-
tegrity of the remaining sectors without doing a bit-by-bit
comparison with the “sealed” original hard disk.
For convenience, the set of sectors (the ones that have been
crossed in Fig. 4) to be deleted is denoted as
and the remaining sectors denoted as
So, the problem can be described as how to verify the integrity
of all sectors in after sectors in have been deleted.
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Fig. 4. Three-dimensional structure.
Let the hash values for sector chains in three dimensions be
denoted, respectively, as follows.
These hash values should be precomputed and stored in a se-
cure place. After the deletion of sectors including LPP docu-
ments, we compare the new hash values for the sector chains
with the precomputed hash values. The integrity of a sector
can still be verified if no sectors in at least
one of its corresponding three sector chains have been deleted.
If that is the case, to verify whether is changed
or not, we do the following.
VERIFICATION(1): We recalculate the three hash values of
sector chain containing , , , and , re-
spectively. Obviously if at least one of the following holds,
we can guarantee the integrity of : or
or .
However, there may exist cases (undeleted sectors) in which
the above does not hold if there exists deleted sectors in its three
chains.
1) A Practical Issue: In our practical cases, if the sectors
containing the evidence are all verifiable using the hash values,
then it is perfect. However, this may not be true. To handle this
case, we make an extra hash value of the affected sectors chain
after the LPP-related sectors are known. Note that this step is
undesirable as it requires the access of the original sealed hard
disk. First, this may not be needed. Second, the affected sectors
are expected to be small compared to the total number of sectors,
so hopefully the chance of damaging the original copy is low
by accessing this limited number of sectors. Of course, since we
will access the sealed copy, there is no need to compute the hash
value of the additional chain, we can directly compare the bit
stream of the affected sectors. However, this would increase the
number of access to the original copy since in practice, we may
Fig. 5. Three-dimensional example.
find out evidence in different stages which may imply multiple
access to the original hard disk.
The modified 3- hash scheme is as follows. Let
be the sectors that fail the verification. For example, all
the black sectors illustrated in Fig. 5 are the affected sectors by
. To verify these sectors, we construct an extra hash value
for the chain of sectors in (see the dashed line in Fig. 5):
It is easy to define an order for the sectors in for com-
puting . For example, we can sort the sectors according to
its first index, then its second index and so on.
VERIFICATION(2): To verify the sectors in , we com-
pute as the hash value for the sectors in and check if
.
Fig. 5 illustrates a concrete example with ,
where ,
, and the extra sector chain is the dash line
with arrows showing the order of the sectors in this chain.
Note that to apply this scheme, we need to modify the “Pro-
cedure for Handling LPP information” given in Section III-A as
follows. Note that the 3- hash values are computed at Step 1.
We need to add Step 5 which is to compute the additional hash
value for the affected sectors chain if needed. Note that both
parties should keep a copy of all hash values computed in the
process. We expect that may not be a very big number com-
pared to the total number of sectors in the hard drive. Therefore,
this computation can be done efficiently. After all hash values
have been computed, there is no need to refer to the sealed orig-
inal hard drive for integrity verification.
E. Identification of Modified or Wrongly Deleted Sectors
In this scheme, based on the verification process, it is possible
to identify the set of sectors that may have been wrongly mod-
ified or deleted when there are mismatched hash values that do
not satisfy the verification (1).
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After the verification, let the set of hash values be the
hash values that fail the verification (1). Then calculate a set,
, including all the intersections of every three hash value of
sector chains . Denote . is
exactly those problematic sectors which are wrongly deleted.
For example in Fig. 5, Assume that we got
. Then all the intersections of every three
sector chains corresponding to hash values form a set
. Finally, we can identify the wrongly deleted sectors
,
which are denoted by triangles in Fig. 5.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The solution proposed by the paper has been adopted to re-
solve the case described in Section II. The following is the ac-
tual procedure (slightly different from what we described in
Section II) used in the real case. Note that the time taken for
the defendant to identify LPP documents is actually very long
which matches our observation that a face-to-face meeting for
identifying LPP documents is not feasible. 1) The Police clones
the original image making two copies—one evidence copy and
one screening copy; 2) The evidence copy is retained and not re-
viewed; 3) The screening copy is provided to the company rep-
resentatives involved in the privilege issue to identify and redact
privileged information; 4) This screening routinely takes a very
long time; 5) Once the screening and redaction is done, the ma-
terial is returned to the Police; 6) It is then digitally compared
against the original evidence copy, and the redactions assessed
for relevance; 7) Only then can the digital forensic examinations
begin.
In Step 1, they use the hashing approach suggested in the
paper (with ). The approach facilitates enough times
at both sides to conduct necessary data identification and
searching, resulting in a more effective, efficient and legally
justified approach to deal with LPP data. Luckily, we do not
need to access the original sealed copy to compute a hash value
for the affected sector as the sectors containing evidence can
be verified by the hash values computed in Step 1. Note that in
this real practical, instead of having only one cloned copy, the
police has created two to increase the resilience. As a remark,
the bottleneck still lies on Step 4 (the screening of files by the
defendant to identify LPP documents). Since there is no proper
way to prescreen the material to validate the claim, it seems
that the proposed approach is still a feasible one and has a good
balance between investigation and justice. Because the LPP
data identification phase took very long time in this real case,
the screening and redaction are only completed for about 30%
of the digital data. Nevertheless, some of the redacted data
have been returned to the police for forensic examination. The
approach was proved to be effective in regard to the current
case progress.
To summarize, in this paper, we address an important, but not
adequately addressed in the community, issue for protecting dig-
ital legal professional privilege (LPP) information during foren-
sics investigation. We highlighted the differences of digital LPP
information and physical LPP information and discussed the
difficulties of handling digital LPP data. We also investigated
the current practices for handling this kind of information and
concluded that these practices cannot guarantee the protection
of LLP data or may create obstacles for forensics investigation.
Also, both practices rely on the face-to-face interaction between
the examiner and the data owner during the identification of
LPP information in the target storage media. As the volume of
storage device become larger, this involves a lengthy process
and it is not practical to require face-to-face interaction.
We then propose a feasible solution to solve this problem.
In our proposed approach, there is no need for both parties to
get together to identify the LPP information, thus providing
a better protection to the privacy of the LPP information and
avoiding the lengthy and impractical face-to-face interaction be-
tween both parties. We show the effectiveness of our solution
on a real case. Future research directions include the following.
The integrity scheme proposed in the paper, of course, is not
the only solution nor an ideal solution to the problem. Finding
a better scheme and procedure to solve this digital LPP protec-
tion problem is always desirable. As this problem is still new to
the law enforcement parties, the number of real cases is limited.
Whenmore real cases exist, a more comprehensive study should
be conducted. The bottleneck process of identifying LPP docu-
ments should be further investigated and see if a more efficient,
but forensically sound approach could be developed. We hope
that this paper can catch the attention of the community to help
developing a better solution to solve this problem.
REFERENCES
[1] P. E. Nygh and P. Butt, Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictio-
nary. Sydney, Australia: Butterworths, 1997.
[2] DFRWS, Report from the First Digital Forensic Research Workshop.
DTR-T001-01 FINAL. A Road Map for Digital Forensic Research,
Nov. 6, 2001.
[3] Cavendish Lawcards Series—Evidence. London: Cavendish Pub-
lishing Ltd., 2004.
[4] R. S. C. Ieong, “FORZA—Digital forensics investigation framework
that incorporate legal issues,” in Proc. Digital Forensics Research
Workshop (DFRWS), 2006, pp. 29–36.
[5] F. Y. W. Law, P. K. Y. Lai, Z. L. Jiang, R. S. C. Ieong, M. Y. K.
Kwan, K. P. Chow, L. C. K. Hui, S. M. Yiu, and C. F. Chong, “Pro-
tecting digital legal professional privilege (LPP) data,” in Proc. Third
Int. Workshop on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engi-
neering (SADFE2008), California, USA, 2008, pp. 91–101.
[6] Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Good Practice Guide
for Computer Based Electronic Evidence [Online]. Available: http://
www.dataclinic.co.uk/ACPO%20Guide%20v3.0.pdf accessed on Jan.
31, 2008
[7] P. Turner, “Selective and intelligent imaging using digital evidence
bags,” Digital Investigat., vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 59–64, 2006.
[8] Anti Cartel Enforcement Manual International Competition Network,
April 2006 [Online]. Available: http://www.internationalcompetition-
network.org/media/library/conference 5th capetown 2006/DigitalEvi-
denceGathering.pdf, accessed on Jan. 30, 2008
[9] P. Turner, “Unification of evidence from disparate sources (digital evi-
dence bags),” in Proc. Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS),
2005, pp. 223–228.
[10] Z. L. Jiang, L. C. K. Hui, K. P. Chow, S. M. Yiu, and P. K. Y. Lai,
“Improving disk sector integrity using 3-dimension hashing scheme,”
in Proc. 2007 Int. Workshop on Forensics for Future Generation Com-
munication, 2007, vol. 2, pp. 141–145.
[11] Z. L. Jiang, L. C. K. Hui, and S. M. Yiu, “Improving disk sector in-
tegrity using k-dimension hashing,” in Proc. 4th Ann. IFIP WG 11.9
Int. Conf. Digital Forensics, 2008, vol. 285, no. 14, pp. 87–98.
828 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. 8, NO. 5, MAY 2013
Zoe L. Jiang is a postdoctoral researcher with the
Shenzhen Graduate School, Harbin Institute of Tech-
nology. She received the Ph.D. degree from The Uni-
versity of Hong Kong in 2010. Her research interests
include digital forensics and applied cryptography.
Junbin Fang is an associate professor with the
Department of Optoelectronic Engineering, Jinan
University, Guangzhou, China. He is also a Visiting
Scholar with the Department of Computer Science,
The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China.
His research interests include digital forensics,
information security, and quantum cryptography.
Frank Y. W. Law has been working with the Hong
Kong Police Force since 1998, and has been involved
in technology-crime-related policing since 2001.
He is currently the Head of Cyber Security of the
Hong Kong Police Force, in charge of three teams
concerning the areas of cyber attack responses. His
research interests include live systems forensics,
digital forensics, and digital timestamp analysis.
Pierre K. Y. Lai is a guest lecturer with the De-
partment of Computer Science, University of Hong
Kong, Hong Kong, China. Her research interests
include cryptography, peer-to-peer networks, and
digital forensics.
Ricci S. C. Ieong is a Ph.D. candidate in the Depart-
ment of Computer Science, The University of Hong
Kong, specialized in peer-to-peer, cloud, and network
forensics.
Michael Y. K. Kwan is an appointed Honorary As-
sistant Professor with the Department of Computer
Science, University of Hong Kong. His research is
on digital forensic analysis.
K. P. Chow is an Associate Professor with the
Department of Computer Science and the Associate
Director of the Center for Information Security
and Cryptography (CISC), The University of Hong
Kong. His areas of research interest are computer
forensics, cryptography, computer security, Internet
surveillance, and privacy.
In the past few years, Dr. Chow has been invited
to be a computer forensic expert to assist the Court in
Hong Kong.
Lucas C. K. Hui is the founder and Honorary
Director of the Center for Information Security and
Cryptography (CISC), and concurrently an associate
professor with the Department of Computer Science,
The University of Hong Kong. His research interests
include different and diversified areas in information
security, privacy protection in e-commerce, Internet
security, mobile device security, smart grid security,
and cryptography.
S.M. Yiu is currently an Associate Professor with the
Department of Computer Science, the University of
Hong Kong. His research interests include computer
security, cryptography, digital forensics, and bioin-
formatics.
K. H. Pun is an Associate Professor of Computer
Science, a Codirector of the Law and Technology
Centre, and the Director of the Hong Kong Legal
Information Institute (HKLII), University of Hong
Kong. He is also a barrister in Hong Kong practising
intellectual property, information technology law,
and other civil matters.
